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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The past two decades have witnessed breathtaking increases in 
computing power, as well as equally impressive strides in manufacturing 
efficiency and technological innovation.1  Powerful, cheap, and 
interconnected, modern personal computers, smart phones, and e-readers 
are rapidly sculpting a landscape of ubiquitous computing.2  From 
shopping online to streaming movies, from social networking to online 
dating, and from paying bills to reading digitized books, the average 
American now expects the convenient digitization of historically analogue 
                                                          
∗ Kelu Sullivan is an associate with the law firm Baker Hostetler LLP in Washington, 
D.C.  The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the firm, or its clients.  This article is for general information purposes and is not 
intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice. 
 
+ I would like to thank Sean Sullivan (Department of Economics and School of Law, 
University of Virginia) for helpful comments on this work and Michael Hirsch (School of 
Law, Catholic University) for dedicated assistance. 
 
1 See generally Mark Weiser, Hot Topics: Ubiquitous Computing, IEEE COMPUTER 71 
(1993), available at http://www.cc.ga tech.edu/~keith/classes/ubicomplexity/pdfs/fo 
undations/weiser-hot-topics.pdf.  
 
2 Ubiquitous computing is a model of human-computer interaction in which monolithic 
desktops are replaced by a variety of small, integrating computing devices that integrate 
computer functionality with aspects of daily life.  See id. at 71.   
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practices and media.  In the workplace, this trend has expressed itself 
through a strong push toward paperless practices.3  In the music and 
movie industries, this trend has heralded the increasing abandonment of 
physical tapes, CDs, and DVDs in favor of instant and on-demand services 
such as iTunes and Netflix.4  In the market for books and print media, this 
trend has evinced itself in the explosive popularity of e-readers and digital 
books.5 
 
[2]  The digital book infrastructure has proven particularly interesting, 
developing rapidly.  While the digital makeover provides new and exciting 
possibilities for readers, at the same time it creates a headache for the legal 
world.6  Books historically have been defined as sets “of written, printed, 
                                                          
3 See id.  
 
4 See Jonathan C. Tobin, Licensing as a Means of Providing Affordability and 
Accessibility in Digital Markets: Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine, 93 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 167, 180-81 (2011).  
 
5 See id. at 171.  
 
6 New technologies were not always welcomed with open arms, but were usually painted 
as the enemies.  The first clear example of this was Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  Sony introduced the VTR, which offered consumers the 
capability to videotape a television show for later viewing, which concerned movie 
studios for two reasons: (1) they believed this “time-shifting” capability violated their 
copyright protection; and (2) the studios wanted to sell their own line of videodisc players 
that did not contain the “time-shifting” capability.  See id. at 420-21, 442;  see also 
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2010) (stating that 
in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that home time-shift recordings were a 
permissible fair use).  At the time, what the movie studios did not foresee was how 
important the VCR was to their survival.  By 1999, 88.6 percent of all U.S. households 
owned a VCR, Nielsen Study Shows DVD Players Surpass VCRs, PR NEWSWIRE, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nielsen-study-shows-dvd-players-surpass-
vcrs-57201447 .html (last visited Dec. 18, 2011), and rental and sale of videos became 
the “largest source of revenue for the [U.S.] movie industry.”  Edward Lee, The Ethics of 
Innovation: p2p Software Developers and Designing Substantial Noninfringing Uses 
Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148 (2005). 
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or blank sheets bound together into a volume,”7 and while theoretically the 
value of the book is not the cost of the paper, but the content of the 
words,8 that maxim has never before been tested in any rigorous sense.  
The e-book model marks a sea of changes for print media, as the content 
of an e-book exists separately from any physical form.9  Free from the 
tangibility-constraints that both benefited and hindered paper books, e-
books strain copyright laws’ ability to accommodate this new media and 
the conventions it entails.10  Similar to many advances in technology that 
decrease the costs of reproduction and distribution of intangible works, the 
development of e-books require a reassessment of the proper legal 
protection for creators. 
 
[3] Recent developments in copyright law only complicate emerging 
issues in the digital book model.11  Steady increases in the length of 
copyright protection in the United States, as well as the erosion of barriers 
to obtaining copyrights, have greatly expanded the set of creative works 
protected by legal restrictions on appropriation and distribution.12  At the 
same time, elimination of formal recordation and notice requirements and 
                                                          
7 Book, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/book (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2011).  
 
8 See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, E-book Readers Face Sticker Shock, WSJ (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com /article/SB10001424052970204336104577096762173802678.html 
(describing how consumers are willing to pay more than $12.99 for a digital book). 
 
9 Id. 
 
10 See infra Section II. 
 
11 See supra text accompanying note 6; sources cited infra note 12.  
 
12 These changes occurred primarily under the Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-512 (1992)) and 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-512 (1988)).  For any work published 
after 2002, the term of the copyright is the life of the author plus 70 years, and for 
corporate authors, 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (whichever 
expires first).  17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).  
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the extension of copyright terms have resulted in considerable public 
confusion over the ownership of many copyrighted materials.13  Through 
passage of time, unrealized protection, or disinterest, many owners of 
copyrights have failed to maintain an accessible link to their protected 
works.14  The existence of absentee owners falls particularly hard on users 
who would appropriate a copyrighted work for their own use, but who 
cannot negotiate a license due to the prohibitive costs of trying to locate 
and contact owners that have abandoned their works, but not their 
copyright protection.15  This class of protected works with absentee 
owners is now so prevalent that it commands its own title: “orphan 
works.”16   
 
[4] The current copyright regime significantly hinders the social value 
and creative impact of orphan works.  Copyright protection, unabated by 
an author’s abandonment, hangs as a veritable Sword of Damocles over 
would-be appropriators, foreclosing many valuable uses and derivations of 
orphan works.17  This limitation has particularly hindered enterprises 
engaged in the digitization of analogue media.18  By far the most widely 
known example of the difficulties of orphaned works for innovators in 
digitization is the plight of Google Book Search (“GBS”).19 
                                                          
13 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS 15-16 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-
report.pdf. 
 
14 See id. at 28.  
 
15 See generally id. at 15.  
 
16 Id. at 1. 
 
17 Id. at 15-16. 
 
18 See, e.g., Bernard Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An 
International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111, 113 (2010). 
 
19 Id. 
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[5] In 2004, Google undertook the ambitious and risky project of 
scanning millions of books, including orphan works, to be made available 
online.20  Recognizing the increasing demand for instant access to 
information in a digital format, Google partnered “with more than forty 
major research libraries and thirty thousand publishers.”21  Google has 
already scanned and digitized the contents of more than twelve million 
books,22 pushing the limits, or the lack thereof, of copyright law on the 
digitization of orphan works. 
 
[6] In 2005, the Authors Guild—on behalf of a class of all U.S. 
copyright holders—as well as the Association of American Publishers, 
filed lawsuits against GBS for copyright infringement.23  The parties 
reached an agreement in the form of an Amended Settlement Agreement 
(“ASA”),24 which the Southern District Court of New York preliminarily 
approved on November 19, 2009.25  The provisions of the ASA not only 
proposed a settlement between the parties for any past infringement, but 
also proposed a forward-looking business arrangement between the 
plaintiff class and GBS that provided GBS a license to scan all out-of-print 
books published before May 5, 2009.26  Importantly, this license conferred 
permission from copyright holders to digitize books in exchange for a 
profit-sharing structure.27  The ASA would have made it possible to scan 
                                                          
20 See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lang, 
supra note 18. 
 
21 Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1308 (2010).  
 
22 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670. 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 Id. at 671. 
 
25 Id.  
 
26 See id. at 671-72. 
 
27 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. at 671-72. 
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all out-of-print books protected by U.S. copyright law by defining the 
class plaintiff as including “all persons (and their heirs, successors, and 
assigns) who, as of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest in one 
or more Books or Inserts implicated by a use authorized by the ASA.”28  
The court rejected the ASA on March 22, 2011.29  
 
[7] In rejecting the ASA, the court admitted the benefits of GBS’s 
creation and maintenance of a digital library, but asserted the ASA would 
“simply go too far.”30  The court stated that the “licensing” portion of the 
ASA, as it is applied to orphan works, would “result in the involuntary 
transfer of copyrights . . . as copyrighted works would be licensed without 
the owners’ consent.”31  The court also asserted that the authority to 
change copyright law properly lies with Congress, not the judiciary.32 
 
[8] If the ASA does not provide the appropriate solution for the orphan 
works problem, then what solution exists?  In light of the current 
predicament, this article proposes a hybrid solution, combining features of 
the ASA, former orphan works legislation, and other areas of copyright 
law that would create a comprehensive solution to the orphan work 
problem.  This hybrid solution includes a legislative amendment that has 
the following components: (1) reasonably diligent search of copyright 
owner; (2) attribution to orphan works in any later use; (3) an orphan 
works registry; (4) a compulsory license fee that would be deposited in an 
escrow account; and (5) a non-legislative component in the form of a 
private licensing body that copyright owners can participate in for the 
purposes of granting collective licenses to third-parties to digitize their 
works. 
                                                          
28 Id. at 671. 
 
29 Id. at 686. 
 
30 Id. at 669. 
 
31 Id. at 673. 
 
32 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
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[9] The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  Section II 
briefly discusses the underlying principles of copyright protection and the 
orphan works problem.  Section III outlines an axiomatic approach to 
assessing and comparing proposed solutions.  Within the axiomatic 
framework, Section IV discusses and compares a legislative solution, a 
market-based solution, and the proposed hybrid solution to the orphan 
works problem.  Finally, Section V concludes the aforementioned 
proposals. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COPYRIGHT LAW ON ORPHAN WORKS 
 
A. The Principle of Copyright Protection 
 
[10] While a rigorous substantive and doctrinal analysis of copyright 
protection lies beyond the scope of this article, critical analysis of the 
orphan works problem requires a minimum level of agreement on the 
objectives copyright law should serve.  Without speaking to the merits of 
any competing motivations for copyright protection, this article focuses on 
the commonly held belief that copyright law remedies the failure of 
markets to incentivize sufficiently the production of non-tangible creative 
works.33 
 
[11] Models of this market failure have commanded considerable 
attention in the law and economics literature.34  Though a useful exercise, 
formal economic models belie the simple intuition behind the market 
failure.  That intuition is this: while the creation of many intangible works 
                                                          
33 See Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement Is Procreative, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 23 (2010) (discussing the twin purposes of copyright law: “to reward 
authors and maximize the creative works actually made available to the public”). 
 
34 See id.; see also Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 126-138 (3d ed. 
2000), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&co 
ntext=robert_cooter.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37 (2003).   
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costs the author considerable resources, reproduction of an intangible 
work is often approximately costless in the modern world.35   
 
[12] As a concrete example, suppose A invests $100 in the creation of a 
novel.  Once A brings the novel to market, B acquires a copy of it, and 
recognizing it will sell well, types it up on her own computer, prints it out 
at next-to-no cost to herself, and begins to compete with A in selling A’s 
own novel in the open market.  Of course B is not the only clever free-
rider standing around: C, D, and E soon realize the potential profits and 
begin mass-producing A’s novel at next to no cost to themselves.  The 
intuitive result is that A’s novel receives wide distribution to nearly the 
entire population, but the intense competition to sell the novel has pushed 
the price down to the marginal cost of production, approximately $0.  So 
A walks away from the experience having spent $100 creating the book, 
having recouped almost no revenue from the popularity of her novel, and 
having learned a costly lesson not to bother authoring anything else in the 
future. 
 
[13] It is important to note that the result of the above story is statically 
ideal.  No person’s consumption of a copy of A’s book precludes anyone 
else from consuming it, and every person who values the book at any 
positive level can afford it.  Put another way, with respect to a non-
tangible creative work already in existence, the resource allocation 
affected by unconstrained (i.e. zero price) consumption of the work is 
welfare maximizing. 
 
[14] The problem with the result of the above story is dynamic.  In the 
story, A learned not to author any books in the future.  Generalized across 
the population, A’s experience would suggest low market incentives for 
authors to produce non-tangible creative works.36  With low incentives to 
produce non-tangible creative works, one should intuitively expect few 
                                                          
35 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA 21-22 (2004), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf. 
 
36 Id. at 22. 
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such works.  Put another way, the production of such a creative work 
involves a large positive externality: the population as a whole benefits 
greatly from the production of the work, but the author does not 
internalize much of this benefit, and therefore finds insufficient motivation 
to produce such works in the first place.37 
 
[15] While numerous solutions to this market failure exist, the historic 
approach in this country has afforded the authors of non-tangible creative 
works the copyright protection of a limited monopoly on the copying and 
distribution of a work.38  By exploiting monopoly power over distribution 
of the work, authors can sell the work at higher than competitive price (i.e. 
the very low cost of reproducing or distributing the work), and thus reap 
monopoly profits from production.39  Note that the copyright system 
attempts to remedy the dynamic problem of the large positive externality 
in authorship at the expense of the static efficiency of widespread 
consumption.40  The potential to earn monopoly profits provides authors 
with the incentive to produce more non-tangible creative works, but at the 
higher-than-competitive monopoly prices, not all potential consumers can 
afford such works, leaving unrealized welfare gains on the table.41 
 
B. The Copyright Orphanage 
 
[16] It is a curious irony that the extension of copyright protection has 
led to the widespread orphanage of creative works.  Since legislation has 
extended copyright terms and restrictions on obtaining copyrights have 
virtually disappeared, more and more owners have abandoned their works 
                                                          
37 Id.  
 
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights to the copyright owner). 
 
39 See COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, supra note 35, at 22. 
 
40 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 552-53 (1996). 
 
41 See COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, supra note 35, at 22. 
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without ever releasing the works from copyright protection.42  This is a 
matter of considerable social importance: the monopoly rights of absentee 
copyright owners forecloses the social value of having orphan works 
adopted, adapted, and made generally accessible.43   
 
[17] Orphan works account for a significant subset of print media.44  
The “commercial life of most books is relatively short (i.e., they generally 
remain ‘in print’ for fewer than five years)  . . . .”45  It has been estimated 
that “[o]f the estimated 40 [million] different books held by [U.S.] 
libraries, well over half are unlikely ever to find their way back into a 
publisher’s favour [sic].”46  Under the traditional market for books, this is 
the end-of-life for these creations, with only the lucky few preserved in 
libraries or private collections.47  Once the books are out-of-print, it is 
often difficult to track down the copyright holder because of the length of 
the current copyright terms and the lack of formalities to obtain 
                                                          
42 See Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF. (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/. 
 
43 See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra 
note 13, at 15-16. 
 
44 See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of 
Digital Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 1025 (2007) (“Although no firm figures are 
available, the estimate of the number of orphan works . . . is large enough that the 
Copyright Office has recommended changes in copyright law that would free them for 
use.”).  
 
45 Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 479, 496 (2011). 
 
46 Richard Waters, Books: A Plan to Scan, FT.COM (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9c722a6-877e-11de-928000144feabdc0.html#axzz1I8bry4 
k1. 
 
47 Id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 2 
 
 11 
copyrights.48  Approximately 2.5 to 5 million books out of the 40 million 
books in U.S. libraries are currently orphans.49   
 
[18] Orphan works do not lose their intrinsic value over time.50  Rather, 
because copyright holders cannot be located in order to gain permission to 
use the works in derivative works,51 or to transform the works into a new 
medium, the continuing value of the works depends upon the orphan 
works becoming a part of the public domain at the end of the copyright 
term, or finding the copyright holder.52  Orphan works, and the lack of any 
serious solution for dealing with the uncertainty of their copyright 
protection, represent an often-prohibitive cost for the creation of new 
works deriving from or containing orphan works.53  Orphan works thus 
                                                          
48 See generally Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding 
Homes for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 267-68 (2006) (discussing the 
concerns copyrighted works such as books that have no statutory provisions create). 
 
49 Waters, supra note 46. 
 
50 See Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, 
and the Constitution: Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 199, 218 (2002) (explaining that many orphan works have “cultural and 
social value, but . . . little economic value”). 
 
51 A derivative work is one that is created from a previously copyrighted work, and in 
order to claim copyright in the new portion of the work, the work that the new work is 
derived from must have been derived from a legitimate use of the previous work.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 
52 Of course, third parties are always free to copy, distribute, make derivative works and 
digitize the work without prior permission.  The third party then bears the risk of possible 
monetary and injunctive relief that the copyright holder might seek.  In the U.S., the 
copyright holder is entitled to the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional 
profits of the infringer, or statutory damages of between $200-$150,000 per work, if the 
work: 1) was published at the time of infringement; and 2) was registered prior to 
infringement (unless the registration was made within three months after first 
publication).  17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 
53 See Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in 
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2011) (“[I]t is unreasonable to 
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counteract the purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause, which is to 
advance public welfare.54 
 
[19] Digitization of orphan works improves public welfare by making 
new expressions of content available.55  The digitization of these books 
can breathe new life into a stale work by increasing access and properly 
aligning incentive structures with the length of the current copyright 
term.56  Copyright holders of out-of-print books now have the choice, no 
matter the date of original publication, to “re-commercialize” their work 
for their own benefit, and thus incentivize new creations.57  But, while 
digitization of books is aligned with the economic philosophy of the 
Copyright and Patent Clause in the United States Constitution, the 
digitization process, as demonstrated in the GBS example, is legally 
hindered by the current lack of solution to the orphan works problem.58  
Put simply, permission to scan books cannot be obtained if the copyright 
holders cannot be found.59  
                                                                                                                                                
prevent creation of a derivative work merely because there is always the possibility that 
in the future someone may be able to prove ownership of the underlying orphan work.”). 
 
54 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
55 See Press Release, Cornell University Library, Univs. Band Together to Join Orphan 
Works Project (Aug. 24, 2011), available at http://news.library.cornell.edu/news/11082 
4/orphanworks. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 See Keith Porcaro, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope, 2010 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, para. 19 (2010) (“In some cases, digitization will no doubt 
reignite interest in a forgotten work, perhaps enough to warrant a reprinting.  This new 
opportunity for revenue with little additional cost on the part of the creator will in theory 
incentivize copyright holders of orphan works to come forward.”). 
 
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Amanda N. Wilson, Comment, Jet-Setting Orphan 
Works: The Transnational Making Available of Works of Unknown Authorship, 
Anonymous Works, or Lost Authors, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 783, 785 n.15 (2009). 
 
59 See Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 493-94. 
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[20] The newly available revenue stream introduced by the digitization 
of books is significant.60  Available copyright holders get to enjoy this 
opportunity cost, as innovators will come to them and bargain for a license 
to digitize.61  Absentee copyright holders, however, cannot enjoy the value 
of this opportunity cost, either: (1) because they are unavailable to bargain 
for a new license; or (2) because fear that the legal punishment might 
exceed potential profits precludes potential licensees from going ahead 
with digitization. 
 
[21] Orphan works pose a significant hindrance to the creation of 
derivative works and the digitization of orphan works.  The orphan works 
problem breaks down the incentive structure of the copyright system for 
the absentee owners, as they cannot fully exploit their works due to the 
inability of third parties to bargain for licenses.62  As the traditional 
publication business model evolves into a digital one, and as current 
orphan books go into the public domain (if the copyright term is not 
extended yet again), this problem will eventually correct itself.  
Digitization means that books in current protection will remain widely 
available as long as sales continue to generate royalties, and, in this state 
of affairs, copyright holders are more likely to keep their contact 
information updated resulting in the abandonment of fewer works.  
Nevertheless, these incentives cannot work their magic on orphan works.  
Stuck in a catch-22 of incentive incompatibility, orphan works grow 
musty on shelves instead of circulating anew online.  Unless authors 
intend to abandon such works, a legal solution is needed to correct the 
current problem.   
 
 
 
                                                          
60 See Porcaro, supra note 57 (discussing the revenue regime constructed by Google for 
the digitization of books under the Google Book Search). 
 
61 See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra 
note 13, at 93. 
 
62 Id. at 15. 
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III. AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO ASSESSING SOLUTIONS 
 
[22] Comparing different policies of copyright protection requires a 
clarification of the objectives sought in a policy change.  In terms of ideal 
objectives, the law and economics literature has suggested many welfare-
maximization models of copyright protection.63  At various levels of 
sophistication, these models generally boil down to an unsurprising 
recommendation: social efficiency results from balancing the dynamic 
benefit incentivizing authorship against the static inefficiency of 
constraining the availability of works once produced.64  A practical 
problem with the formal welfare-maximization approach is that moving 
from abstract generalities to concrete recommendations requires the 
imposition of strong and often untenable modeling assumptions; therefore, 
precision is bought ultimately at the expense of credibility.65 
 
[23] As an alternative to reliance on strong assumptions about 
important unknowns in social welfare, this article pursues a low-
assumption, axiomatic approach in assessing the desirability of various 
solutions to the orphan work problem.  Rather than trying to say what 
policy would prove universally optimal, this approach asks the question 
more narrowly: what policy would obviously improve upon the current 
one?  Put another way, this article seeks a policy for disposing of the 
orphan work problem that is a Pareto Optimality upon the current policy 
                                                          
63 See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 37, 71, 85, 210 (discussing various 
models of copyright protection). 
 
64 See Sami Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the Incentive/Access 
Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in Support of the Proposed New 
§514 to the Copyright Act 50-51 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-15, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=895554. 
 
65 Charles Manski has termed this type of problem the “Law of Decreasing Marginal 
Credibility.”  In brief, the law states that stronger assumptions yield sharper, but less 
credible predictions.  CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION AND 
DECISION 2-3 (2007). 
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regime.66  In terms of the orphan work problem, the requirements of a 
Pareto improving policy are easily expressed as two intuitive axioms that 
any adequate solution must satisfy.  Axiom 1: The absentee owners of 
orphaned works must not be made worse off as a result of the policy 
solution.67  Axiom 2: The accessibility of non-tangible creative works 
must be marginally increased as a result of the policy solution.  These 
axioms define a class of policy solutions that are preferable to the current 
situation.  As noted in the following application of the axiomatic approach 
to various proposed solutions, many properties of an adequate solution to 
the orphaned work problem can be observed, even in the absence of strong 
modeling assumptions. 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO ORPHAN WORK PROBLEM 
 
A. Legislative Approach 
 
1.  Proposed Legislation 
 
[24] After extensive review of the issues implicated by orphan works, 
the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”) prepared a report 
on orphan works that proposed a legislative solution to the problem.68  
                                                          
66 A Pareto Optimality is defined as a resource reallocation that makes at least one party 
strictly better off and no party worse off.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
67 See The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), LIBRARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Pareto.html (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2012).  For sake of brevity, the following analysis considers the value of a 
copyright to be economic profit attainable from possession of a limited copyright over 
distribution of the copyrighted work.  It is worth noting that possession of a copyright 
might be valuable to creators for other reasons: e.g. the pride that comes from “owning” 
one’s creation or an artist’s “right” to control how a work is adopted and adapted.  See 
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 
16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 81, 163-64 (1998). 
 
68 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 5.  
However, the proposed legislation died in the House of Representatives.  David Kravets, 
‘Orphan Works’ Copyright Law Dies Quiet Death, WIRED, Sept. 30, 2008, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/orphan-works-co/. 
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The proposed legislative solution would allow a user to appropriate an 
orphan work only if the user first performed “a reasonably diligent search 
for the copyright owner but is unable to locate that owner . . . .”69  The 
standard of a reasonably diligent search is essentially an “ad hoc” 
determination,70 and the reasonably diligent search does not shield the 
user from liability from payment of reasonable monetary compensation to 
the absentee owner if he later appears.71   
 
[25] The proposed orphan works legislation provides absentee owners 
the ability to recover damages and seek injunctive relief for the 
appropriation of their work without prior permission, but limits remedies 
on account of the owners’ inability to affirmatively grant or deny 
permission.72  Absentee owners may recover monetary damages for only 
commercial uses, and, even then, only reasonable compensation 
representing “the amount the user would have paid to the owner had they 
engaged in negotiations before the infringing use commenced.”73  
Injunctive relief is available to absentee owners if a user digitizes a work 
in its entirety without modification, but not if the user incorporates the 
orphan work into “a derivative work that also includes significant 
expression of the user . . . .”74 
 
[26] The Copyright Office rejected two alternative features suggested 
by various commentators to the proposed legislation: (1) an escrow 
account into which each user must pay prior to engaging in the use of 
                                                          
69 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 8. 
 
70 Id. at 11. 
 
71 See id. at 12-13. 
 
72 See id. at 8. 
 
73 Id. at 12. 
 
74 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 13. 
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orphan works;75 and (2) the creation of a user registry where users register 
an intent-to-use an orphan work, a description of the work, and the 
certification that the reasonably diligent search was conducted.76  The 
Copyright Office eschewed the inclusion of an escrow account because it 
considered the chances of copyright holders coming forward to claim 
royalties deposited into the escrow account as low, which suggests escrow 
funds would rarely be distributed.77  Furthermore, the Copyright Office 
rejected the proposal for a user registration because it believed such a 
registry would prove burdensome for those using numerous orphan works, 
and because a textual database would not assist users without some sort of 
unique identifier for each work, which would be difficult to administer.78  
The proposed legislation has been pending in Congress since April 2008.79 
 
2. Solution Analysis 
 
[27] A sufficient condition for the legislative solution to constitute an 
obvious improvement upon the status quo is satisfaction of both axioms 
defined in Section III.  The legislative approach seems likely to satisfy  
Axiom 2, but most likely violates Axiom 1. 
 
[28] Axiom 1 requires that any policy change not make absentee 
owners worse off.  At first glance, this determination, a formidable 
undertaking, is simplified greatly by similarity of the status quo and 
legislative solution’s assignment of rights in most situations.  In fact, from 
                                                          
75 See id. at 11, 113-14 
 
76 See id. at 112-13.  
 
77 See id. at 11, 113-14. 
 
78 Id. at 114. 
 
79 See S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008) (as passed by Senate, Sept. 26, 2008); H.R. 5889, 
110th Cong. (2008) (as forwarded by Subcomm., May 7, 2008).  However, “[b]ecause 
this bill was introduced in a previous session of Congress, no more action can occur on 
it.”  H.R. 5889: Orphan Works Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/cong 
ress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-5889 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   
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the absentee owner’s perspective, the two policy regimes differ only under 
a narrow set of facts: (1) the user must have exercised due diligence in 
attempting to locate the absentee owner; (2) the user must have failed to 
locate the owner; (3) the user must subsequently have appropriated the 
owner’s protected work; and (4) the owner must have eventually 
discovered the appropriation. 
 
[29] In this narrow situation, current copyright law affords the absentee 
owner a valuable set of rights: the owner is entitled to either: (1) legal 
relief from copyright infringement, including injunctions, actual damages 
and profits, and statutory damages and attorneys’ fees if the copyright was 
registered within three months of publication and prior to infringement;80 
or (2) any compensation package and licensing fee privately negotiated in 
the shadow of potential legal relief, or indeed the issuance of an 
injunction.  By contrast, the proposed legislative solution affords the 
absentee owner an ostensibly less valuable set of rights: the owner is 
entitled to either (1) reasonable monetary compensation,81 or in the case 
“where the use was noncommercial and the user ceases the infringement 
expeditiously upon notice,” no compensation;82 (2) injunctive relief only if 
the orphan work was included in a derivative work that has transformed 
the work sufficiently as to not limit the absentee owners’ right to exploit 
the orphan work (now no longer orphan);83 or (3) any compensation 
package and licensing fee privately negotiated in the shadow of the limited 
potential legal relief.84  It is also possible that, by the time the absentee 
owner discovered the appropriation of his copyright, the user himself may 
qualify as an absentee owner (especially if copyright terms continue to be 
extended). 
                                                          
80 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504-505 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 
81 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 11. 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 Id. at 12. 
 
84 See id. at 84, 93. 
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[30] As a practical matter, it seems clear that the proposed legislative 
solution affords absentee owners a less valuable set of rights than under 
the status quo.  While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it illustrates 
at least a reasonable concern that absentee owners will be made worse off 
as the result of the proposed legislative solution due to the decrease in 
possible compensation from infringement and opportunity to exploit their 
own work. 
 
[31] Axiom 2 requires that the accessibility of the orphan works be 
increased marginally relative to current copyright law.  The proposed 
legislation easily satisfies Axiom 2.  Under the current system, the risk of 
appropriating an orphaned work without permission of the absentee owner 
is much greater than under the proposed legislation.85  The marginal 
decrease in potential damages suggests that users are marginally more 
likely to accept the risk of appropriating orphaned works, thus marginally 
increasing the accessibility of such works in derivative (which may not 
have been possible without the orphan work) or digitized form.   
 
[32] Based on the above analysis, it seems unlikely that the proposed 
legislative solution would constitute a Pareto improvement upon the 
current system.  The legislative solution benefits potential users of 
orphaned works, but does so at the expense of absentee owners.  This does 
not mean that the proposed orphan works legislation is bad or even 
undesirable; nevertheless, it does mean that the legislative solution is not 
the obvious improvement over current copyright law sought under the 
axiomatic approach. 
 
B. The GBS Solution – a Market Response 
 
1. Amended Settlement Agreement 
 
[33] GBS entered into a settlement agreement with the class of 
copyright holders represented by the Authors’ Guild and the Association 
                                                          
85 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 15-16. 
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of American Publishers for the sake of certainty and efficiency, which was 
rejected on March 22, 2011.86  Despite its ultimate rejection by the 
Southern District Court of New York, the ASA model is worth studying as 
a potential solution to the orphan works problem. 
 
[34] The ASA attempted to create a market solution to the orphan 
works problem.87  For GBS to succeed Google needed to index as many 
books in its collection as possible: if the ASA forced GBS to omit 2.5 to 5 
million orphaned books, the success of the project would be impeded 
substantially.88  The ASA sought to remedy the narrow aspect of the 
orphan works problem relevant to GBS, namely, Google’s use of orphaned 
books in a digitization capacity.89  The ASA included a settlement contract 
between Google and a class of owners defined, after the amendment, as 
“all persons . . . who, as of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest 
in one or more Books or Inserts implicated by a use authorized by the 
ASA.”90  The only option for exclusion from the settling class was for the 
                                                          
86 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The purpose 
of the GBS project was to index the books and make them available either in full (if the 
book is in the public domain or if display is authorized), or show a preview of the content 
of the book, in snippets, and offer links to stores and libraries where users can locate a 
physical copy of the book.  See id. at 669-70.  GBS’ defense is that indexing and making 
available snippets of the in-copyright and out-of-print books is fair use, such that prior 
permission is not needed for this adaption of a protected work.  Id. at 670-71. 
 
87 See id. at 669.  Google was well aware of the orphan works problem before the start of 
the GBS project, and is a proponent of the proposed orphan works legislation.  
Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 522-23. 
 
88 See Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 525 n.221 (citing 
Memorandum from William Morris Endeavor Entertainment (Aug. 2009)), available at 
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/commentary/wme.pdf). 
 
89 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671; see Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, 
supra note 45,  at 495 (citing Letter from David Drummond, Vice President, Corporate 
Dev. & Gen. Counsel for Google Inc., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int‘l 
Affairs for U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 25, 2005)), available at http://www. 
copyright.gov/orphan/ comments/OW0681-Google.pdf). 
 
90 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671. 
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copyright holders to opt-out affirmatively.91  This automatically included 
absentee copyright holders as, by definition, part of the class.92 
 
[35] Had the ASA received approval, it would have created a 
significant advantage for Google because Google would have received the 
right to digitize all orphan books without engaging in reasonable efforts to 
locate the absentee copyright holders93, while enjoying the benefit of 
immunity to potential litigation arising from infringement in the future.94  
No other party would have enjoyed the same benefits without duplicating 
Google’s efforts.  The ASA also provided that Google would fund the 
creation of the Book Rights Registry (“BRR”), which would have 
allocated the royalties earned by GBS and also tracked down copyright 
holders to appropriately distribute royalties through a complicated 
algorithm.95  
 
2. Solution Analysis 
 
[36] If satisfying both axioms outlined in Section III,  the GBS 
settlement agreement would constitute a Pareto improvement over the 
current system.  Based on this analysis, it appears that the ASA would 
have satisfied the conditions of both Axiom 1 and Axiom 2.   
 
                                                          
91 This option to opt-out was exercised by 6800 rights holders.  Id. at 673.  This was one 
of the reasons that Judge Chin rejected the ASA.  See id. at 670.   
 
92 See id. at 681. 
 
93 See id. at 669, 673.  A Books Right Registry was charged with the task of finding and 
locating unknown copyright holders, as well as distribute the license fees paid to it by 
Google among its members.  See id. at 671-72.   
 
94 Id. at 676. 
 
95 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72. 
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[37] Under Axiom 1, policy changes cannot make absentee owners 
worse off and still qualify as a Pareto improvement.96  In fact, it seems 
likely that the absentee owners would have been considerably better off 
under the ASA than under the current copyright scheme.  The relevant fact 
pattern for consideration under this scenario is slightly different than the 
fact pattern considered for the proposed orphan works legislation.  Under 
this fact pattern: (1) GBS locates an out-of-print book and, without inquiry 
as to the location of the owner, digitizes the book; (2) Google makes 
revenue on the digitized book and shares profit with BRR; (3) BRR cannot 
locate the owner; and (4) the absentee owner resurfaces and notices that 
Google has digitized her book without permission. 
 
[38] The current copyright system affords an absentee owner the right 
to sue Google upon discovery of the digitization, which could result from 
any of the following outcomes: (1) Google is assessed a licensing fee 
either as the result of a settlement or judgment after litigation;97  (2) 
Google is enjoined from showing or selling snippets of the books;98  or (3) 
Google’s digitization efforts are considered fair use, and no monetary 
relief is offered to the absentee owner.99  
 
[39] Under the ASA, absentee owners within the settling class would 
have essentially given Google a compulsory license to digitize any out-of-
print books (published before January 5, 2009) whose copyrights are 
owned by the absentee owners.100  Absentee owners, upon resurfacing, 
can collect reasonable compensation from Google for Google’s 
digitization of their books; compensation is provided by BRR and based 
                                                          
96 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 
100 See Amended Settlement Agreement § 2.2, Authors Guild, 700 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 
05 CV 8136-DC) [hereinafter ASA]. 
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on the sales and advertising revenues earned by Google.101  The ASA 
would provide absentee owners the same monetary relief as the proposed 
orphan works legislation, without litigation and without uncertainty from 
litigation.102  Additionally, in the event that absentee owners resurface, 
these owners would possess the option to ask Google to remove the book 
from the registry, and Google must comply with the request as soon as 
reasonably practicable, but no later than thirty days from the date of the 
request.103   
 
[40] The only difference in relief between the current system and the 
system proposed by the ASA is the right for the absentee owners to get 
statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.104  Under current laws, additional 
monetary relief is available only if the author registers the copyright 
within the first three months of publication and before any infringement 
occurred.105  It is unlikely that this requirement would change copyright 
owners’ likelihood of recovery because monetary compensation in a 
copyright infringement case is based upon a combination of the copyright 
owner’s lost revenues and the infringer’s profits.106  Given that Google 
only digitized out-of-print books without permission, it is unlikely that the 
absentee owners could prove any lost revenues.  Also, Google already 
shares its profits with BRR, who provides them to the absentee owners.107  
Even in the event that statutory damages and attorneys’ fees were 
                                                          
101 See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
  
102 See id. 
 
103 ASA, supra note 100, § 3.5(a)(i). 
 
104 Compare id. § 5.5 (capping attorneys’ fees at $30 million), with 17 U.S.C. § 504 
(2006) (providing statutory damages), and 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006) (providing reasonable, 
but uncapped, attorneys’ fees).  
 
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
 
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 
107 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72.  
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available, the absentee owners would need to engage in costly litigation in 
order to recover statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.  Because absentee 
owners are not likely to successfully claim statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees, and because of the high transaction costs and uncertainty 
involved in recovery through litigation, the “compulsory license” fee to be 
paid by Google to the absentee owners seems likely to confer at least as 
great a benefit to absentee owners as provided by the current system.108  
Thus, the absentee owner is made no worse off, and likely placed in a 
better position under the current system than under the proposed 
legislative solution to the orphan works problem.109 
 
[41] Under Axiom 2, the accessibility of the orphan works would have 
increased significantly under the ASA,110 even more so than under the 
proposed orphan works legislation.  Had the court approved the ASA, 
Google could have digitized all out-of-print books as long as it paid the 
appropriate royalties to BRR.111  Additionally, because the agreement 
constituted a settlement agreement, it would have eliminated future 
uncertainty regarding infringement for all books published before January 
5, 2009 that Google might scan.112  The cost-savings and certainty 
                                                          
108 Compare ASA, supra note 100, § 2.1 (giving an overview of the benefits of the ASA 
for copyright owners), with 17 U.S.C. § 504 (embodying the current statutory recovery 
rights of infringed copyright owners).  Google’s digitization of an out-of-print book does 
not affect any existing market, and thus there is no lost revenue for the absentee owners.  
The money generated by GBS is a newly found revenue stream. 
 
109 Compare ASA, supra note 100, § 2.1 (proposing a streamlined system by which 
copyright owners who cannot be easily found are compensated for infringement by 
Google), with U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 10, at 8 
(suggesting limiting a copyright owner’s recovery in litigation if the infringer performed 
a reasonably diligent search for the owner). 
 
110  See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670. 
 
111 See ASA, supra note 100, § 3.1(a).  
 
112 See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 676. 
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afforded by the ASA would have allowed Google to scan, digitize, and 
make accessible more orphan books than without the agreement.113 
 
[42] Even if the proposed orphan works legislation could govern 
Google’s conduct, the terms of the ASA would still place Google in a 
better position.  If governed by the proposed legislation, Google would 
have to expend efforts to determine whether a book is an orphan work 
before proceeding with the digitization of the book.  Even then, Google 
would not enjoy the certainty provided by the terms of the ASA.  If an 
absentee owner reappeared, Google would have to pay reasonable 
compensation because Google uses the books for commercial purposes, 
and, under the proposed orphan works legislation, Google might also be 
subject to injunction.114  Finally, the uncertainty of potential litigation 
would stand as a considerable disincentive for Google to continue 
scanning and digitizing orphan books. 
 
[43] Based on this analysis, the ASA would have been a Pareto 
improvement over the current system, and even over the proposed orphan 
works legislation, because the absentee owner would be no worse off and 
the access to orphan works would significantly increase.  Between Google 
and absentee owners, the ASA solution would have been an obvious 
improvement upon the current copyright system. 
 
C. Hybrid Solution Proposal 
 
[44]  After considering both the legislative and ASA models detailed 
above, it appears that a hybrid solution, combining features from the 
proposed orphan works legislation, the now rejected ASA, and some other 
features of copyright law – such as compulsory licenses – may improve 
                                                          
113 Under the proposed legislation, everybody may digitize or incorporate an orphan work 
after a reasonably diligent search for the author of a work.  See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 122.  Under the ASA, the right to do so is 
granted only to Google.  See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83. 
 
114 See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 13. 
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upon certain shortcomings inherent in each of the above solutions 
alone.115  The proposed orphan works legislation creates a more 
systematic approach and applies this approach broadly.116  Unfortunately, 
it does so by taking away only part of the offending uncertainty, 
decreasing potential recovery for absentee owners, and maintaining the 
same transaction costs for recovery.117  The ASA, on the other hand, 
eliminates uncertainty for users, guarantees reasonable recovery for 
absentee owners, and significantly reduces transaction costs.118  However, 
the scope of the ASA is limited because it would only apply to books, and 
would allow only Google to digitize out-of-print books.119  This 
significantly limits the benefits of the ASA model, and the problem of 
digitizing orphan works requires a much broader solution.  I suggest that a 
hybrid solution is best suited to affect the common goal of the ASA and 
legislative solutions: that is, to provide reasonable compensation to 
absentee owners – in the event that they reappear – without limiting the 
ability of users to appropriate and build upon orphan works in the 
meantime.  
 
1. Components of the Hybrid Solution 
 
[45] The proposed hybrid solution combines features of the proposed 
orphan works legislation, the ASA, and current copyright law to improve 
upon the status quo.  The components in the hybrid solution to the orphan 
works problem are as follows: 
 
a. a reasonably diligent search and attribution 
requirement; 
                                                          
115 See supra Parts IV.A.2 and IV.B.2. 
 
116 See supra Part IV.A. 
 
117 See supra Part IV.A. 
 
118 See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72. 
 
119 See id. at 672. 
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b. an orphan works registry where users register works 
determined to be orphaned after conducting a 
reasonably diligent search; 
c. an escrow account for the payment of the compulsory 
license fee from users to absentee owners; and 
d. the creation of a licensing entity for non-absentee 
owners120, similar to ASCAP, BMI and SESAC for 
music. 
 
These components, analyzed in detail below, would affect a solution to the 
orphan works problem that satisfy both axioms proposed in Section III. 
 
a. Reasonably Diligent Search and Attribution 
 
[46] A reasonably diligent search requirement is an important 
component for any orphan works solution.  Without such a requirement, 
the misappropriation of non-orphan works is more likely than not.  A 
reasonably diligent search defines what constitutes an orphan work: 
orphan works are works whose copyright owner cannot be determined or 
located through a sufficiently detailed search effort.121  If the owner of the 
work is identified, but does not respond to a request for a license, that 
work does not qualify as an orphan work, and any appropriation of the 
work constitutes copyright infringement.122  This is consistent with the 
commonly accepted principle of copyright protection that copyright 
holders have the right to refuse reproduction and distribution of their 
work.123  The terms of a reasonably diligent search will vary depending on 
the type of work and the court will determine whether a search is 
reasonably diligent on an ad hoc basis.124  The proposed orphan works 
                                                          
120 This represents the non-legislative component of the hybrid solution. 
 
121 See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 1. 
 
122 See id. at 8-9. 
 
123 Id. at 9. 
 
124 See id. at 95-100. 
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legislation includes a requirement for a reasonably diligent search for the 
owner of an appropriated work. 
 
[47] Attribution of an appropriated orphan work in a derivative work 
confers two important benefits: (1) it may help absentee owners recognize 
their work and come forward to claim ownership of it; and (2) it provides 
notice of an orphaned work heritage to later users who wish to appropriate 
the derivative work.125   
 
b. Orphan Works Registry 
 
[48] The orphan works registry would require users to register works 
they believe are orphan works.126  The Copyright Office would manage 
the registry.127  The user would provide the Copyright Office with the 
name of the work and the reasonable steps taken to find the owner.  This 
registry would uniquely identify each orphan work, and subsequent users 
would rely on the registry to determine whether a work has been 
designated an orphan after a reasonably diligent search.128  If so qualified, 
subsequent users would not need to conduct their own reasonably diligent 
search before appropriating or adapting the work.  The orphan works 
registration would save transaction costs for users, as users of a common 
work would not need to engage in redundant search reporting 
                                                          
125 See id. at 110-12. 
 
126 Although the benefit of such a registry for all future copyright creators is important, if 
the registry is simply voluntary, it is likely that only a few will choose to register the 
orphan works with the registry.  Making the registry mandatory will increase registration 
of orphan works, and encourage users to start their reasonably diligent search at the 
registry, which will help decrease transactional cost incurred because of repeated 
searches conducted each time a user wishes to use an orphan work. 
 
127  See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUKE LAW SCHOOL, ORPHAN 
WORKS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 10-11 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.law.duke. 
edu/ cspd/proposal.pdf. 
 
128 See id. at 9-10 (for discussion of what qualifies as a “reasonable diligent search”). 
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requirements.  If the copyright holder believes that there is a mistake, he 
would have a record of whom he needs to contact to remedy the situation. 
 
[49] The Copyright Office rejected the proposal for a registry where 
users register the orphan works they intend to use for the purpose of 
providing a “published” notice to copyright holders, similar to the registry 
for a compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords.129  
The Copyright Office premised its rejection on a belief that such a registry 
would place an excessive burden on copyright holders to keep checking 
the registry to ensure no one has misappropriated a work.130  Some groups 
opposed such a proposal on the basis that it would “impair their 
competitive position with other publishers, who would use the filings to 
determine what books or types of books they plan to publish.”131 
 
[50] The orphan works registry would differ from the proposed users’ 
or owners’ registries because the right to use the orphan work would not 
derive from the registration of orphan works with the registry.132  Rather, 
the registry would serve as a centralized forum for the copyright 
community to share information about a particular work and mitigate the 
unnecessary transaction costs inherent in redundant reasonably diligent 
searches.133  The registration process should not be so burdensome as to 
discourage registration or use, but should provide sufficient detail to 
identify an alleged orphan work through registry search.  For example, a 
copy of the work might be included for proper identification, or summary 
and descriptive keywords might be used to limit the search space. 
                                                          
129 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 105. 
 
130 See id. at 76.  
 
131 Id. at 112-13. 
 
132 See generally CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 127.  
 
133 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 78-79 
(discussing the benefits of “piggybacking” or allowing a user to rely on a previous user’s 
searches by improving efficiency in searching).  
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c. Compulsory License 
 
[51] A compulsory license is “where the government requires that 
copyright owners make their works available to users, usually at a fixed 
price.”134  Canada has instituted a compulsory license as a solution to the 
orphan works problem in Canada.135  There are also several examples of 
compulsory licenses used under United States copyright law, including 
secondary transmission by cable systems,136 ephemeral recordings,137 
public performance of sound records by means of a digital audio 
transmission,138 making and distributing phonorecords,139 certain works in 
connection with non-commercial broadcasting,140 secondary transmission 
by satellite carriers,141 and distribution of digital audio recording devices 
and media.142  A compulsory license is also available as a monetary 
damage award in patent infringement cases.143  The ongoing royalty 
payments from Google to BRR in the ASA could have been construed as a 
compulsory license agreement between Google and the settling class. 
                                                          
134 S. J. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory 
License (Progress & Freedom Found., D.C.), June 10, 2003, at 3, available at 
http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf.  
 
135 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 77 (Can.). 
 
136 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).  
 
137 17 U.S.C. § 112. 
 
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
 
139 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 
140 17 U.S.C. § 118. 
 
141 17 U.S.C. § 119; 17 U.S.C. § 122. 
 
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 
143 Cf. Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F. 3d 1293, 1313 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing between ongoing royalty order and compulsory license).   
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[52] In determining the appropriate compulsory license system for 
orphan works, this paper reviews two compulsory license systems: (1) that 
applying to the making and distribution of phonorecords; and (2) the 
patent compulsory license.  
 
i. Compulsory License for Making and  
Distributing Phonorecords 
 
[53] The most well known compulsory license is the compulsory 
license for the making and distributing of phonorecords.144  This provision 
allows a third party to distribute a new sound recording of a musical work 
if that work has been previously distributed to the public under the 
authority of the copyright owner.145  In exchange, the third party must 
provide notice of the intention to obtain a compulsory license,146 as well 
as deposit a royalty payment.147  This compulsory license system has built 
in a protocol for absentee owners, where if the copyright holder is not 
known, then the notice and payments are sent to the Licensing Division of 
the Copyright Office.148  The compulsory license prevents monopolistic 
behavior related to a particular musical work, while continuing to provide 
the incentives to encourage the creation of new musical works by paying 
the creators a compulsory license.149   
 
 
                                                          
144 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 
145 See id. 
 
146 37 C.F.R. § 201.18 (2008).   
 
147 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73: COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND 
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS 2, (2011), available at http://www.copyright. 
gov/circs/circ73.pdf.  
 
148 Id. at 3. 
 
149 See id. at 1-2. 
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ii. Patent Compulsory License 
 
[54] The concept of compulsory patent licensing dates back to the early 
amendments made to the Paris Convention of 1883.150  Today, the Paris 
Convention and its progeny, in conjunction with the WTO’s Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”)151, 
authorize compulsory licensing in various situations.152  Courts often 
impose a patent compulsory license after litigation determines that patent 
has been infringed.153     
                                                          
150 See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 
365, 371 n.40 (2002) (“The concept of compulsory licensing was not mentioned in the 
1883 Paris Convention . . . [but] was introduced as an amendment in the 1925 Hague 
Revision . . . .”); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, 
Mar. 20, 1883 (amended Sept. 28, 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583. 
 
151 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 2, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“In respect of Parts II, III, and IV of this 
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the 
Paris Convention . . . [and] [n]othing shall derogate from existing obligations that 
Members may have to each other [thereunder] . . . .”). 
 
152 See id. at arts. 30-31 (describing compulsory licensing in regulating scenarios 
“[w]here the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third 
parties authorized by the government . . . .”). 
 
153 Yet, despite its long-term acceptance abroad, federal courts and commentators 
traditionally rejected the compulsory license as a proper remedy in patent infringement 
disputes, instead favoring an injunction against the patent infringer.  See Jaideep 
Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBAY v. 
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 34 (2009) (explaining that prior to 2006, “[t]he 
prevalence of the view that private bargaining of property rights leads to more efficient 
outcomes than ‘judicial guesstimates’ of appropriate royalty rates led to judicial and 
academic disapproval of compulsory licensing of patents”) (citing In re Mahurkar Double 
Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1396-97 (N.D. Ill. 
1993)). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 2 
 
 33 
[55] The right to a patent comes from the same clause in the United 
States Constitution as the right to a copyright.154  Patentees are given a 
limited monopoly to exclude others from practicing their inventions 
without their permission, and in exchange for this monopoly, patentees 
must reveal their inventions to the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office for public use after the patent term expires.155  Patents have a much 
shorter lifespan than copyrights, and patentees have to follow recordation 
and periodic payment requirements of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office to maintain the life of the patent, so there are typically 
no orphaned patents.156 
 
[56] Although the Patent Act’s filing requirements generally foreclose 
the notion of orphaned patents, the most analogous aspect of patent 
compulsory licensing is the recent debate regarding the different treatment 
of practicing patentees and non-practicing patentees with respect to their 
right to legal relief during litigation.157  The Supreme Court recently 
responded to disagreement regarding the appropriateness of injunctive 
relief for non-practicing patentees in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
                                                          
154 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.8. 
 
155 See generally Patents, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last 
modified Dec. 22, 2011) (“A patent is an intellectual property right granted by the 
Government of the United States of America to an inventor ‘to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States’ for a limited time in exchange for public 
disclosure of the invention when the patent is granted.”). 
 
156 See generally General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO.GOV (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (describing maintenance fees to maintain the 
patent in force).  
 
157 See Venkatesan, supra note 153, at 28 (“[There] are those who argue that awarding 
injunctive relief to . . . nonpracticing patentees and those holding patents of questionable 
validity or value[] causes a ‘hold up’ problem in which such patentees can obtain 
royalties greater than the true value of their patents.  In this view, overcompensating 
patentees distorts the incentives to innovate, design, and sell new technologies to the 
detriment of the economy and public interest.”). 
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L.L.C.,158 unanimously holding that the traditional four-factor test159 
followed by federal courts in considering permanent injunctive relief 
should be applied to disputes under the Patent Act.160  The Court 
emphasized broad equitable discretion in applying this standard and 
denounced the practice of issuing injunctions automatically once a party 
shows infringement.161  Although the Court limited its holding to general 
principles,162 eBay revitalized compulsory licensing by ensuring that 
judges consider modern patent practices and how such circumstances 
impact the suitability of injunctive relief.163   
 
[57] District courts have responded accordingly, denying injunctions to 
non-practicing patentees in favor of compulsory licensing orders.164  
                                                          
158 eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 
159 See id. at 391 (“A plaintiff [seeking injunctive relief] must demonstrate: (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 
160 See id. at 391-94. 
 
161 See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J. concurring) (“From at least the early 19th century, courts 
have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of 
patent cases. . . .  This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entitle a patentee to 
a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue.”). 
 
162 See id. at 394. 
 
163 See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“In cases now arising trial 
courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced 
and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier 
cases. . . .  The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well 
suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in the 
patent system.”). 
 
164 See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(vacating a district court injunction order and ordering a compulsory license); Paice LLC 
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding court’s 
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Subject to a reasonable royalty determined by the court, a proven infringer 
becomes an authorized licensee if royalties are paid to the non-practicing 
patentee.165  The royalties to be paid from infringer to non-practicing 
patentee should be reasonable with the limitation to the rate set by the jury 
or other licenses by the non-practicing licensee.  These royalty rates do not 
take into consideration the position of the parties in litigation, and what 
type of royalty rates the parties could establish through private bargaining 
in light of any pending litigation.166 
 
iii. Proposed Orphan Works Compulsory License 
 
[58] This paper proposes that an escrow account, similar to the BRR or 
the Licensing Division of the Copyright Office, be set up so that each time 
a user incorporates an orphan work in a derivative work, or digitizes an 
orphan work, a statutorily prescribed amount is deposited into the account 
governed by the Copyright Office.  Absentee owners may at a later time 
reclaim royalties on their orphaned works.  The escrow account would 
function similarly to the account that currently receives royalties for 
making and distributing phonorecords under Section 115 of the Copyright 
Act,167 except the proposed escrow account would not make payment 
unless and until an absentee owner claimed right to the royalty.  The 
Copyright Office has rejected the creation of such an escrow account 
because it believes it unlikely that any absentee owners would come 
forward to make a claim for compensation, and because it is logistically 
                                                                                                                                                
authority to issue an “ongoing royalty” order); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. 
Supp. 2d 437, 439-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (providing a thorough analysis under eBay’s four-
factor test in denying injunction request). 
 
165 See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315 (“[W]here the district court determines that a permanent 
injunction is not warranted . . . [it] could step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of 
the ongoing infringement.”). 
 
166 See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. and Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 600, 605-06 (E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 
167 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
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complicated to determine who would keep track of the payments and what 
should be done with unclaimed money.168   
 
[59] Proponents of an escrow account for orphan works believe this 
system would reduce uncertainty inherent in the currently proposed 
legislative solution, while still allowing absentee owners to sue and 
possibly enjoin users of the orphan works.169  A compulsory license would 
alleviate potential litigation and transactional costs, while providing 
monetary relief to absentee owners at the same time.  The infrastructure 
for such a system is already available to the Copyright Office, as the 
Copyright Office currently maintains a registry system for notices of 
intentions and accepts compulsory license payments for making and 
distributing phonorecords of unknown owners.170  
 
[60] Canada has adopted a similar system, in which the Copyright 
Board licenses orphan works on behalf of absentee owners.171  The benefit 
of certainty and the maintenance of payment of reasonable fees for the 
absentee owners create a low-transactional cost, high-incentive solution to 
the accessibility of the orphan works problem. 
 
d. Creation of a Private Entity for Licensing of  
Non-Orphan Works 
 
[61] Legislative action would not create any private entity for licensing 
of non-orphan works, and would not directly cover orphan works.  Instead, 
market-based aspects of the hybrid solution would help prevent works 
from becoming orphaned in the first instance, and would lower transaction 
costs for companies who wish to utilize or digitize copyrighted works.  
                                                          
168 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 11. 
 
169 See id. at 114. 
 
170 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73: COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND 
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS, supra note 147, at 3. 
 
171 See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 77 (Can.). 
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The private licensing entity would function similarly to the performance 
rights organizations that already exist for the music industry, such as 
ASCAP, BMI or SESAC.172  These performance rights organizations have 
bargained with individual copyrights holders for the right to license their 
copyrighted work.  The performance rights organizations undertake the 
task of entering into license agreements for each work and then make 
available the right to publicly perform the work in a collective license to 
third parties.173  For example, a convention center is likely to have a 
license to publicly perform individual songs through a single license with 
a performance rights organization.  These collective licenses have enabled 
hotels, airports, and radio stations to get a few blanket licenses that would 
cover all the songs that they may publicly perform in their space, without 
having to engage in individual bargaining with each rights holder.174 
 
[62] A similar private licensing organization should be set-up for books, 
similar to what the BRR would have been under the ASA.  Each 
individual copyright holder would negotiate and enter into a license with 
the licensing organization, and the organization would then grant a 
collective license to Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, or any other user that 
might want to scan books covered by the license.  As long as revenue 
streams continue to flow to copyright holders, the incidence of work 
abandonment should fall considerably.  This type of organization would 
thus slow the orphanage of creative works while simultaneously easing 
transaction costs in individual bargaining for large digitization projects. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
172 See ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); BMI, 
http://www.bmi.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); SESAC, http://www.sesac.com (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2011). 
 
173 See, e.g., Do You Need an ASCAP License, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (discussing the licensing of music). 
 
174 See, e.g., id. 
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2. Hybrid Solution Analysis 
 
[63] Under the axiomatic approach under Section III, Axiom 1 is 
clearly satisfied for the same reasons the ASA satisfies Axiom 1.  The 
hybrid solution would provide absentee owners the right to claim 
reasonable monetary compensation in the event that the absentee owners 
resurface.175  Where the hybrid solution differs from current copyright 
law, the compulsory license scheme affords absentee owners payment of 
reasonable compensation through an escrow account without incurring the 
transaction costs and uncertainty of litigation.   
 
[64] Axiom 2 is also satisfied because accessibility to orphan works 
should marginally increase relative to the status quo.  The hybrid solution 
provides users certainty as to the cost of using an orphan work, 
eliminating the need to worry about potential litigation costs, including 
potential judgments of monetary and injunctive relief.  Reductions in 
uncertainty and potential liability under the hybrid solution should create 
marginal reductions in the cost of orphan work appropriation, and thus 
affect marginal increases in creative work availability.  Importantly, the 
increased accessibility would include works beyond books, and would not 
be limited to Google as the sole provider.  Instead, third parties would be 
incentivized to enter the book digitization market, potentially expanding 
orphan works’ availability beyond what Google could achieve alone.  
Thus, the hybrid solution would likely provide more access to orphan 
works than under the current copyright system or the ASA solution. 
 
[65] This analysis suggests the hybrid solution would constitute a 
Pareto improvement upon the current system.  Reasonably compensated 
for low to no transaction costs, and with certainty as to the compensation, 
absentee owners are almost certainly made no worse off than under the 
current policy regime.  At the same time, the availability of orphan works 
is increased marginally relative to the status quo.  Thus, the hybrid 
                                                          
175 As explained supra Part IV.A.2, it is not likely that absentee owners would be able to 
claim statutory damages, which would only be available to copyright holders who 
registered the copyright within three months of publication but before infringement. 
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solution represents what might be called an obvious improvement upon 
current copyright law for orphaned works. 
 
[66] Importantly, the hybrid solution also improves upon aspects of 
both the legislative and ASA solutions.  The hybrid solution improves 
upon the current legislative proposal in several ways: (1) it would remove 
uncertainties for both users and absentee owners; (2) it would guarantee 
payment to absentee owners without litigation upon resurfacing; and (3) it 
would decrease transaction costs of reasonably diligent searches.  These 
improvements would make orphan works more accessible—thus 
increasing public welfare—and meet both Axioms proposed under Section 
III.  The hybrid solution also improves upon the now rejected ASA.  First, 
the scope of the hybrid solution applies more broadly than the ASA by 
covering all orphan works.  Second, the hybrid solution would affect 
greater competition among appropriations, in turn increasing accessibility 
and lowering cost to access the digitized works. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[67] Recent technological innovations have allowed end-users to access 
information in larger quantities and at higher speeds than ever before.  
Especially in the area of digitized books, technology develops at a rapid 
pace, and copyright law has struggled to keep up.  The orphan works 
problem presents an ugly example of the expanding gap between 
technological applications and the flexibility of copyright.  This problem 
demonstrates the need for change in the current copyright law. 
 
[68] Unfortunately, attempts to address the orphan works problem 
through the courts appear unavailing.  Google tried to solve this problem 
through a market-based contract, but found itself rebuffed on the grounds 
that it tried to solve the problem through the wrong venue.176  A legislative 
approach to the orphan works problem appears more promising, but the 
current pending legislative proposal seems insufficient.  In terms of the 
                                                          
176 See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying 
the amended settlement agreement). 
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axiomatic approach adopted in this paper, the proposed legislation simply 
fails the aforementioned Axiom 1: it does not obviously protect absentee 
owners from being made worse off than under the current system.   
 
[69] By combining some of provisions of the pending legislation, 
features of the ASA, and the already existing licensing infrastructures and 
ideas, the legislative solution proposed by this article demonstrates a 
Pareto improvement on the status quo, the proposed legislation, and the 
ASA.  The proposed hybrid solution would finally bring copyright law on 
orphan books to the digital age.  The hybrid solution is not perfect, and it 
does not solve all problems revolving around orphan works, but compared 
to the current copyright system, it is a Pareto improvement.     
 
[70] As a practical matter, any legislative proposal will face obstacles, 
because reasonable people disagree on what would be the best solution.  
The proposed hybrid solution is sufficiently comprehensive, but leaves 
room for change and improvement, as implementation may raise 
additional issues.  It presents a forward-looking solution for a legal 
problem that continues to change with developing technology.  
 
 
 
 
